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Introduction: the G20 must support multilateral trade liberalisation 
Mike Callaghan1 
 
 
Overview 
 
This issue of the G20 Monitor is devoted to the topic of international trade and the role of the 
G20.  
 
Over the coming months, the Monitor will be covering in detail a number of issues that are, 
or could be, on the G20 agenda. For example, over the next few months there will be an issue 
on ‘Financial regulation and the G20’ and another on ‘Development and the G20’. The 
question we are asking on each issue is ‘where can the G20 add value?’ 
 
The G20 and international trade 
 
If one of the main roles of the G20 is to provide a circuit-breaker to intractable international 
economic issues, then the collapse in 2008 and continuing impasse in the WTO Doha 
Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations must be a prime candidate for the 
G20’s attention. 
 
Developments in international trade, the state of multilateral and regional trade negotiations, 
and the role of the G20, are covered in this issue of the Monitor with papers from Peter 
Gallagher, John Ravenhill, Mark Thirlwell and Brett Williams. 
 
These papers delve into some of the complex issues associated with trade negotiations. 
Keeping markets open is critical to meeting the fundamental objectives of the G20, namely 
promoting growth and creating jobs. As highlighted in the extensive work of the OECD, trade 
promotes growth, creates jobs and increases incomes.2 
 
This point was recognised by APEC ministers responsible for trade, when they noted at their 
meeting on 20-21 April 2013 that they ‘…recognize the importance of international trade as 
the engine of growth, job creation and source of development.’3 
 
The G20’s record on the standstill – mixed at best. 
 
At their first meeting in Washington DC in November 2008, G20 leaders committed  
‘…within the next 12 months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to 
trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports.’4 This standstill on 
protection was extended at the London Summit in April 2009 until end-2010, renewed for a 
further three years until end-2013 at the Toronto Summit in June 2010, and extended again at 
the Los Cabos Summit until end-2014. 
                                               
1 Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 Douglas Lippoldt, ed., Policy priorities for international trade and jobs, OECD, 2012. 
3 APEC Ministers responsible for trade, Statement on Supporting the Multilateral Trading System and WTO 9th 
Ministerial Conference. 2013 Meeting of APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade April 20-21 2013: 
http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Ministerial-Statements/Trade/2013_trade/2013_mrt_standalone.aspx. 
4 G20, Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy. 2008. 
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But as outlined by Mark Thirlwell, even an assessment of compliance with the standstill on 
protectionism based solely on the reports commissioned by leaders from the WTO, OECD 
and UNCTAD is a mixed one. There has been a steady accumulation of trade restrictions by 
G20 members, although as Thirlwell points out, there has been no widespread retreat to 
protectionism. This is an area where the G20 has claimed credit. However, as Thirlwell also 
notes, other trade policy assessments are not as sanguine as the official product, pointing to a 
rise in ‘murky protectionism’ in the form of non-tariff barriers that are not subject to 
multilateral trade rules.  
 
G20’s record on Doha – poor 
 
In terms of concluding the Doha Development Round, the G20 has failed to show leadership. 
At various summits, leaders committed to completing an ‘ambitious and balanced’ conclusion 
to the Round, and trade representatives were instructed to use ‘all negotiating avenues’. At 
the Seoul Summit, leaders said that they recognised that 2011 was a critical window of 
opportunity and they were now entering ‘the end game’. But this sense of urgency and 
commitment did not appear to be transmitted back to the trade negotiators in Geneva, and 
rather than ‘ending the game’ with a successful conclusion, the Doha Round appears to have 
collapsed in failure. The G20 has conspicuously and repeatedly failed to deliver on Doha, 
damaging its credibility on trade policy. 
 
The rise of mega-regional trade agreements 
 
Peter Gallagher points out that trade agreements signal the commercial policies of 
governments. Similarly, not concluding an agreement is also a signal. It signals that 
governments are withdrawing from ambitious attempts to open world markets in favour of 
preferential trade arrangements, particularly mega-regional agreements. He suggests that the 
G20 should read with disquiet, if not alarm, the fact that the two most prominent members of 
the forum, the United States and China, have signalled a continuing divergence in their trade 
objectives and are pursuing separate discriminatory mega-regional trading agreements. 
Gallagher believes that the mega-regional trading agreements being pursued by the United 
States – the  Trans-Pacific partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
partnership (TPIP) – threaten to divide the global trading system into two large, although 
non-exclusive, regions defined by the discriminatory preferences in the US led agreements. 
Those discriminated against will include all the major emerging markets including China, 
India, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil and Nigeria (although China has recently indicated that it is 
considering joining the TPP.) 
 
Brett Williams provides a summary of the political problems associated with multilateral 
trade liberalisation and how such influences have resulted in the proliferation of 
discriminatory trade agreements. 
 
Implications of global value chains 
 
John Ravenhill outlines the change that has been taking place in international trade with value 
chains being the principal engine of globalisation. The fragmentation of production has 
dramatically transformed the structure of international trade, integrating developing 
economies into manufacturing networks. International trade increasingly represents trade in 
components as part of the production of a product. With global manufacturing, goods are now 
‘made in the world’ rather than in a single country. Ravenhill points out that one implication 
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of the rise in global value chains is that traditional trade statistics, which are measured on a 
gross basis rather than value-added, are obsolete. As such, much of the concern over bilateral 
trade imbalances is clearly misplaced. Furthermore, Thirlwell points out that with economies 
so interconnected and integrated, traditional trade policy is no longer an effective tool to 
assist domestic industries, and that traditional understandings of trade policy based on these 
older approaches are similarly obsolete. He also notes that the same applies to the WTO, 
which, distracted by Doha, has not kept pace with the need for new rules governing the 
intertwining of trade, investment, intellectual property and services. In short, the rise of 
integrated global value chains require a change in the traditional mercantilist approach to 
trade, which views exports as ‘good’ and imports as ‘bad’.  
 
Where next for the multilateral trading system? 
 
The Doha Round is at an impasse. Some would say it is dead. But does this also apply to the 
overall commitment of WTO members to the multilateral trading system? 
 
A decisive milestone may well be the outcome from the WTO 9th Ministerial Conference 
(MC(9)) that will take place in Bali from 3-6 December 2013. The approach to MC(9) is 
meant to reflect recognition that because not all the elements of the Doha Round can be 
concluded simultaneously, different negotiating strategies will be employed in an effort to 
advance areas where progress can be achieved. The areas identified for delivery at MC(9) 
include trade facilitation (an agreement on reforms to streamline the movement of goods 
across borders), agriculture (including the controversial issue of whether building food 
stockpiles is a form of subsidising agriculture) and specific issues relevant to least developed 
countries (LDCs – including implementing an agreement for granting duty-free and quota-
free access to goods originating from LDCs, and special and differential treatment for LDCs 
which exempts them from some WTO rules). 
 
A successful outcome of the Bali WTO trade ministers meeting would mean that there was 
still life in the multilateral system – and in the WTO as a negotiating forum for trade 
liberalisation. But the prospects are not promising. In a statement released on 2 May 2013, 
the current WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, warned that the current pace of work was 
insufficient to deliver outcomes at MC(9) in Bali.5 
 
The view of business 
 
Under the Russian G20 presidency, the B20 (business leaders) task force on trade submitted 
the following preliminary recommendations for the St Petersburg G20 summit in September 
2013:6    
 
• Extend the deadline for standstill and monitoring protectionism until 2015, further 
strengthen the monitoring system and explore incentives to roll back protectionism. 
• Commit to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and finalise the text of the 
agreement by the September G20 summit and conclude the final agreement at the Bali 
Ministerial in December. 
                                               
5 Pascal Lamy, Director-General Pascal Lamy’s statement: informal trade negotiations committee meeting at the 
level of head of delegation. WTO April 11 2013: 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/tnc_infstat_11apr13_e.htm. 
6 B20-G20 Partnership for Growth and Jobs, Recommendations from Task Force. Moscow, 2013. 
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• Encourage the leadership role in establishing principles to guide the design of 
preferential trade arrangements with the aim of making them compatible with and 
complementary to WTO rules. 
What can the G20 do? 
 
The recommendations from the B20 are similar to a number of the proposals made by 
Thirlwell, Gallagher, and Ravenhill as to what the G20 can do to support the multilateral 
system. Their proposals include: 
 
• Place international trade at the heart of the G20’s commitment to deliver economic 
growth and employment. 
• Extend, upgrade and refine the standstill agreement on protectionism to cover WTO-
consistent measures of protectionism (non-tariff barriers). 
• Harvest what can be saved from the Doha Round by reaching agreement on trade 
facilitation, duty-free and quota-free access for LDC’s goods, phase out farm export 
subsidies, reform the WTO dispute settlement system, and introduce new disciplines 
on food export controls. 
• Encourage the WTO to bring the trade policy agenda into the 21st century, recognising 
the importance of services trade and global supply chains. 
• Recognise the scale of the proposed/pending mega-regional trading arrangements and 
seek to negotiate the provisions of the mega-regionals with a beforehand view to their 
global application. Positive provisions in the mega-regional arrangements are likely to 
set global standards which would be adopted by countries outside the region. 
• Advance plurilateral agreements within the WTO, whereby subsets of countries with 
ambitious trade agendas could forge ahead with agreements on certain issues and at 
the same time allow those countries with reservations to stand aside. 
Williams advocates that G20 members take small, tangible steps towards non-discriminatory 
trade liberalisation. His argument is that if there is no multilateral agreement to reduce trade 
barriers, and the trend is towards discriminatory regional arrangements, then there will be no 
mechanism to move towards less rather than more discrimination. As such, he believes the 
G20 should take incremental steps to reduce margins of preference and continue to gradually 
eliminate discrimination in international trade.  
 
Is there a need for a multilateral investment agreement? 
 
Ravenhill questions whether there is also a need to negotiate a global treaty on foreign direct 
investment. The fragmentation of production processes, which has driven global value chains, 
is generally thought to be associated with the rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
developing countries. As such, facilitating FDI is considered an important component of 
helping developing countries become plugged into global value chains. Accordingly, the 
establishment of a multilateral investment agreement which would regulate certain aspects of 
FDI and standardise investor protection is often presented as assisting developing countries 
access to FDI.  
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The B20 supports the development of a ‘G20 investment agreement’. The preliminary 
recommendation to leaders from the B20 investments and infrastructure working group was 
for G20 members to reinforce cross-border investment activity by agreeing on a set of 
recommendations governing a G20 multilateral investment framework and setting minimum 
standards to be endorsed by all G20 governments. 
 
Ravenhill, however, says that the relationship between FDI and global value chains is not 
straightforward. Significant numbers of global value chains are associated with little or no 
foreign direct investment. Rather than a multilateral agreement, there has been a proliferation 
of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and many of the recent bilateral trade agreements have 
chapters on investment. The argument can be made, however, that the large number of BITs 
(the average country has more than 35 international investment agreements)7 demonstrate the 
need for a multilateral investment agreement. As things currently stand, a potential investor 
seeking to locate a production facility overseas would have to examine a vast number of 
bilateral agreements. Ravenhill points out that previous attempts to negotiate a global 
investment treaty foundered on conflicts over the balance of rights and responsibilities and it 
is unlikely that new attempts will be any more successful.  
 
It comes down to leadership 
 
Any trade agreement, be it strengthening and extending the standstill on protection or 
harvesting components from the Doha Round such as a Trade Facilitation Agreement, will be 
very difficult to conclude. But if the G20 is to be the premier forum for international 
cooperation, then one of its highest priorities should be in maintaining the multilateral trading 
system and the multilateral approach to trade liberalisation. Previous G20 summit 
declarations have contained rhetoric on trade, but this has not translated into tangible action. 
To breathe life into the multilateral trading system will require a focused effort by G20 
leaders. 
 
 
 
                                               
7 Anders Aslund, The world needs a multilateral investment agreement. Policy Brief, Number PB13-01. 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2013. 
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Mega-regional trade agreements and the next transition 
 
Peter W Gallagher  
 
 
Summary 
 
All members of the G20 must rely on the policy guarantees of the WTO to secure their trade 
policy interests during the coming global economic transition in which China will displace 
the United States as the world’s largest economy. But both China and the United States (the 
G-2) have chosen to pursue regional trade strategies that ignore each other and the WTO 
(except as a means of managing trade disputes). This is more harmful to the future of the 
multilateral trading system than the collapse of the Doha negotiations. This paper evaluates 
options for restoring the momentum of trade negotiations in the WTO that will maintain the 
credibility of the multilateral system, engage the interests of the G-2, and minimise the 
divergence of interest that led to the collapse of the Doha negotiations. Specifically, G20 
economies should seek to translate modalities for the liberalisation of goods, non-tariff 
measures (NTMs), and services restrictions in mega-regional agreements to agreements in 
WTO. This would be a substantial commitment to the continuing credibility of the 
multilateral system during a period of global economic transition. 
 
Alarming signs 
 
Trade agreements signal to both domestic and international agents the direction that a 
government’s commercial policies will take for some indefinite period. If an agreement 
contains credible commitments, firms, households and investors will adapt their own 
expectations and plans quickly, perhaps before the agreements enter into force. This 
signalling process accelerates and smooths adjustment by ensuring that all stakeholders are 
on ‘the same page’ when the associated domestic reforms are implemented.8 
 
Choosing not to participate in or conclude a trade agreement is also a signal. That is why the 
collapse of the Doha negotiations in December 2008 was so resonant. It appeared to signal 
that governments were withdrawing from ambitious attempts to open world markets. Coming 
at a time when a collapse of confidence in global financial markets was dragging the world 
economy into a deep recession, the signal seems particularly portentous and gloomy. 
 
Now the global economy is making a slow, uneven recovery with many regions still 
experiencing weak growth and barely managing their debt burdens, there is again reason to 
ask what signals governments are sending by their trade negotiation initiatives. The two most 
prominent members of the G20, the United States and China, whose disagreement in Geneva 
in 2008 finally pulled down the rickety Doha negotiations, have now chosen to signal a 
continuing divergence in their trade objectives that the G20 should view with disquiet, if not 
alarm. 
 
The discriminatory mega-regionals now being actively pursued by the Obama administration, 
especially, threaten to divide the trading system into two large, although non-exclusive, 
regions defined by the discriminatory preferences in the US-led agreements. One bloc will 
                                               
8 China's entry into the WTO, and the arduously negotiated policy changes it agreed to embody in its Protocol of 
Accession is a classic case of such policy signalling. By far the most important audience for the Protocol was 
the domestic political economy, not foreigners. But China's is only the most prominent example among many. 
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include Europe, Japan, the ‘British offshoots,’9 Mexico, Peru and Chile. Those discriminated 
against will include all of the giant emerging economies including China, India, Indonesia, 
Russia, Brazil and Nigeria.10   
 
In view of the continuing changes in the distribution of world trade and production – 
characterised by the relative dynamism of the emerging economies and the slowing of the rest 
– this policy seems foolish, at best. As the centres of economic ‘gravity’ move over the next 
twenty years, only the multilateral system will provide a universal guarantee of, and 
enforceable rights to, non-discriminatory treatment of trade. 
 
The G-2 talk past each other 
 
On the narrowest construction, the distance between success and failure in the 2008 efforts to 
drive the Doha Round to a conclusion was the distance between the United States’ and 
China's negotiating positions. The USTR, Susan Schwab, believed the Administration could 
win Congressional approval for a 'package' deal that included some – rather small11 – cuts in 
US farm subsidies plus some additional concessions from China on cuts in non-agricultural 
protection. China demurred: it had at least four years to run under the stiff (and even 
prejudicial) transitional terms of its Protocol of Accession to WTO that brought its 
commercial policies in line with the most liberal standards for a low-medium-income 
developing economy.  
 
Since then, neither in the United States nor China is there any indication that preferences 
have changed in favour of multilateral market-opening initiatives. The Obama administration 
has chosen to peg the trade policy goals of its lame-duck second term to two regional ‘mega-
agreements’ – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) – that spin the words ‘free trade’ out of the title. Each has 
strong marquee value as a foreign-policy initiative and in combination seem geographically 
comprehensive. 
 
But the most remarkable aspect of President Obama's trade policy initiatives is that they 
avoid constructing any bridge to the United States' most significant trading and investment 
partner. China is already the United States' top supplier of imports and third largest export 
market and by far the fastest-growing foreign direct investor. China is also very likely to be 
the world’s largest economy within the next twenty years, strongly suggesting that the United 
States would want to have every opportunity to build clear access to Chinese producers and 
consumers.  
 
At best, the United States policy might be explained as a response to the fact that China is 
presently showing no signs of interest in building that bridge either. But that characterisation 
would be more generous than necessary to the Obama administration, which seems to have 
structured its TPP participation in a way that discourages Chinese accession to the 
negotiations. Since 2011 when the United States became involved in the negotiations, the 
agreement seems to have been structured as a 'hubs and spokes' agreement of smaller 
                                               
9 See Angus Maddison’s historical grouping of United States, Canada, Australia in Angus Maddison, The world 
economy: historical statistics, OECD, 2003. 
10 Australia, New Zealand and Japan, happily, may be able to ‘straddle’ the two blocs, by participating both in 
the US-led bloc and the RCEP that will include China (see below). 
11 Will Martin and Aaditya Matoo, The Doha Development Agenda: what's on the table? The Journal of 
International Trade & Economic Development 19 (1) 2010, pp 81-107. 
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economies with the United States as opposed to a plurilateral structure – like the European 
Communities, for example – where all parties have uniform rights and obligations.12  
 
The subsequent accessions of Canada, Mexico and Japan to the negotiating group confirm 
this US-centric format, since each followed a bilateral negotiation with the United States in 
which terms for joining the TPP that reflected US objectives were agreed upon. Although it is 
no surprise that the United States and other TPP parties would want all those joining the 
negotiation to pre-commit to the general objectives (e.g. ‘free trade’, innovative agreements 
on non-border regulations, simplified rules-of-origin etc.) it is easy to understand why China 
would be as unwilling also to meet preconditions set by the United States for its participation 
in a region-wide, nominally plurilateral, framework. 
 
Not surprisingly, the United States TPP initiatives have been widely perceived in China as 
hostile to China's interests and to its role in the Pacific region.13 Supporters of the President's 
program boastfully describe participation in the mega-regionals as a test distinguishing 
‘leaders and laggards’ in world trade.14 
 
For its part, China too has taken some – more tentative – steps in the construction of a 
network of regional trade relationships that exclude the United States. For an economy of its 
size, China has ratified relatively few bilateral agreements; it has a 'partial coverage' regional 
agreement with ASEAN, and FTAs with three relatively small Pacific economies (Chile, 
Costa Rica, and New Zealand). In 2012, China agreed to join talks on a 'mega-regional' 
agreement – the Regional Cooperative Economic Partnership – led by the ASEAN countries 
and that includes Japan, Australia and India but does not extend to the United States. The 
RCEP has been described by the official Chinese media as 'countering' the TPP.15 
 
To appreciate why this mutual disengagement by China and the United States is bizarre and 
worrisome, it is useful to take a step back and view it in the perspective of the past twenty, 
and the next twenty, years. 
 
Transition in the global economy 
 
Even if the world tomorrow were likely to be much like the world today it would be 
disquieting that the United States and China should have chosen trade agreement agendas that 
further embed the misalignment that stymied the WTO. Both have actively employed the 
WTO dispute settlement process to define the margins of their trade relations: 8 of the 11 
complaints brought by China have been against the United States and 15 of the 30 cases in 
which China has been the respondent have been US complaints. But to rely for management 
of disputes on the provisions of the very trade framework that their divergent policies have 
weakened seems like a recipe for instability. 
 
                                               
12 It is impossible to verify the configuration of the market access deals because the Governments negotiating 
the TPP have decided to keep all drafts confidential. 
13 Ann Capling and John Ravenhill, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: an Australian perspective. 2013: 
http://www.alliance21.org.au/themes/trade-and-investment.  
14 Daniel Altman, Trade coalitions of the willing. Foreign Policy, March 18 2013: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/18/trade_coalitions_of_the_willing_barack_obama. 
15 Weijiang Feng, Going beyond the free trade agreements and establishing a new East Asian economic order. 
Xinhua News (English), 9 November 2012: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-
09/11/c_131857806.htm. 
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In reality, the probability that the distribution of economic power tomorrow will be quite 
unlike the distribution today elevates ‘disquiet’ to ‘consternation’. Between now and 2030 the 
centre of gravity of the global economy will move across the Pacific. The new order will be 
characterised (in ways that are not yet clear) by the dominance of large economies that are 
not particularly wealthy. China will be the world's largest economy, probably by a substantial 
margin,16 and its success will have been secured by the multilateral trading system. 
 
Although there is little sign of it so far, the wealthy economies will eventually have to 
contemplate the implications of their displacement from the economic dominance they have 
enjoyed for two or three centuries. A multilateral system that abstracts from pure power, and 
which was originally designed to safeguard their markets from the exercise of coercion by 
one of their own number, is now likely to be their best guarantee that the new, emerging, 
powers will be similarly constrained. So it is all the more worrying that the WTO, on whose 
provisions all of the G20 rely, is struggling to remain credible in the face of the G-2's 
embrace of mega-regional agreements and will not be in a strong position to claim their full 
adherence if their economic interests diverge further during the ongoing reallocation of 
economic power between them. 
 
Supporting the multilateral system 
 
For the past four or five years, the multilateral system has 'muddled through’; although there 
has been no obvious deterioration, there has also been little forward momentum and it retains 
the role of the inevitable trade regime that almost every state has joined or intends to join. 
What could the G20 do to ensure that the multilateral framework continues to thrive and that 
it continues to supply effective guarantees for the future interests of the less powerful wealthy 
as well as the more powerful middle-income giants? 
 
Regrettably, despite the contribution that the WTO's guarantees have made to its economic 
achievements, China remains hesitant to participate in collaborative management of a global 
trade 'commons' that extends across customs borders. China remains attached to a state-
centric, 'Westphalian' or 'non-interference' model of the global polity.17 According to Western 
analysts,18 China has little or no interest in the trading system as an international public good, 
and shares few or none of the liberal economic governance norms that underlie the GATT 
and WTO and that are reflected in their respective Preambles. Although it has gradually 
begun to support some moderately revisionist objectives for international institutions 
intended to redress ‘inequities’, China still conceives of its own responsibilities as ending 
inside its borders. Accordingly, there is so far no sign, for good or for ill, that China considers 
leadership in the trading system as a significant or beneficial means of projecting its already 
considerable trade power. 
 
With little prospect of mutual entente between the United States and China on action to 
restore vigour to the multilateral trading system, the G20 must seek alternative ways to 
                                               
16 Even if China's growth were to slow over the next two decades to two thirds of the rate it achieved in the last 
three decades – 6.6 per cent a year on average compared with 9.9 per cent – it will outstrip the United States in 
economic size before 2030, see World Bank and P.R.C. Development Research Centre of the State Council, 
China 2030 : building a modern, harmonious, and creative high-income society. Washington, DC, The World 
Bank, 2012. 
17 Lai-Ha Chan, Pak K. Lee and Gerald Chan, Rethinking global governance: a China model in the making? 
Contemporary Politics 14 (1) 2008, pp 3-19. 
18 David Shambaugh, China goes global: the partial power. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
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reinvigorate the multilateral system. But resumption of the multilateral negotiations remains, 
probably, out of its reach. To avoid a repetition of the Doha debacle, either the agenda for 
future negotiations must address only those concerns which are shared by all WTO members, 
or the negotiations must adopt a 'critical mass' approach to decision-making that avoids the 
clumsy 'Single Undertaking' expectation that all members will participate in every negotiation 
and abide by every rule.19 A ‘critical mass’ approach has the advantage of extending the 
WTO's frontiers – albeit at the cost of accepting free-riders on the plurilateral agreement 
embodying the results of the negotiation.20 
 
In fact, WTO members have already taken some steps on both of these paths. The 
negotiations aimed at completing an agreement on Trade Facilitation by the end of 2013 
address a multilateral interest that seemed universally shared by members even in 2008 when 
the rest of the Doha agenda collapsed. Twenty-one members are also exploring services 
negotiations aimed at extending the Uruguay Round services schedules of commitments on a 
plurilateral, ‘critical mass’, basis. If these efforts succeed – by no means certain – they will 
open or improve the operations of valuable markets and provide some evidence of the 
continuing commitment of members to the system. But they fall short of resolving the 
divergence of interests. China is participating in the Trade Facilitation negotiations, but not in 
the proposed Services plurilateral. The United States is engaged in both. 
 
A 'China Round'? 
 
A more ambitious suggestion comes from World Bank economists Aaditya Mattoo and 
Arvind Subramanian. They urge a comprehensive China Round: ‘a China-inspired agenda – 
whose aim would in fact be to anchor China, to the maximum extent possible, in the 
multilateral trading system.’21 They suggest multilateral negotiations that would further cut 
duties to compensate for China's relatively low level of preferential access to goods markets; 
significantly improve services commitments – relatively weak in China's 2001 GATS 
schedule – by cutting barriers to  below the level currently prevailing in most WTO 
economies; clarify rules on foreign direct investments; extend the liberalisation of 
government procurement; and develop new disciplines giving more secure access to food and 
energy resources. 
                                               
19 The meaning of ‘single undertaking’ changed at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994. What had formerly 
been a process for managing multi-part negotiations (‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’) was 
transformed by the G-7 into a constitutional requirement that every economy acceding to the WTO must comply 
with every one of the several dozen ‘core’ WTO agreements (those attached to the 1994 protocol that 
established WTO). The G-7 insisted that this should be a prior condition on any GATT member’s accession to 
the new organisation; no partial participation. But the Single Undertaking had a perverse effect. Because a 
consensus of the full membership is needed to amend or adopt new agreements, it ensures that member 
economies that are most reluctant to liberalise their market regulations will hold up decisions until they 
represent no threat to their interests. Contrary to the intention of the G-7, the Single Undertaking now ensures 
lowest-common-denominator outcomes. 
20 Any agreement concluded within the 'precincts' of the WTO must comply with the MFN provisions of GATT 
and GATS. In other words, the benefits of the agreement must extend universally to WTO members even if they 
are not among the ‘critical mass’ of members that have agreed to submit to the obligations of the agreement. 
‘Critical mass’ means, in effect, accepting ‘free riders’ on the basis that they do not upset the calculus that 
makes the agreement worthwhile to participants. But the free rides must rankle if they include, for example, 
China or India. The current 'critical mass' plurilateral agreements, such as the Information Technology 
Agreement and the Understanding on Financial Services are MFN agreements; China is a member of the former 
but not of the latter. 
21 Aaditya Matoo and Arvind Subramanian, China and the world trading system. Policy Research Working 
Paper no. 5897. World Bank, 2011. 
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These are sensible suggestions. But it seems very unlikely that such a round of negotiations 
would recommend itself to WTO members unless China itself were to pursue it and to be 
willing to 'deal' in order to make it happen. While China does not show that level of interest 
or initiative in the WTO, it would be unrealistic to expect other governments to come forward 
with unilateral offers. 
 
'WTO 2.0'? 
 
Richard Baldwin has tried to define a zone of convergent interest  – for the G-2 among others 
– in a plurilateral agreement he calls ‘WTO 2.0’22 that would drive 'complex' deepening of 
trade commitments, especially on investment and intellectual property (IP), among those 
economies deeply engaged in supply network trade. These topics have already been on the 
WTO agenda in one way or another, including as parts of the Doha Round agenda (known as 
the ‘Singapore Issues’) that were abandoned at the Cancún Ministerial Meeting in 2003, so 
Baldwin is probably right to assess that WTO is not about to pursue them. He observes that 
the ‘deepening’ of market-integrating rules in these domains is on the agenda of some of the 
‘mega-regional’ agreements. But, he argues, the mega-regionals cannot create the kind of 
broad, quasi-global advances that would most benefit supply-network trade.23 Accordingly, 
Baldwin advocates the creation of a ‘WTO 2.0’ to house such agreements, by which he seems 
to mean a plurilateral, ‘critical mass’ agreement outside the precincts of ‘WTO 1.0’. 
 
It is not clear, however, that China’s interest in supply-network trade would overcome its 
reluctance (above) to engage in ‘deeper’ regulatory integration so the ‘quasi-global’ character 
of ‘WTO 2.0’ must be in doubt from the start. It might, in any case, be a self-defeating way to 
support supply-network trade. The majority of the rules governing trans-border trade are 
contained in ‘WTO 1.0’. They are even more fundamental to trades that cross multiple 
borders than the investment and IP issues that Baldwin prioritises.24 Creating a ‘WTO 2.0’ 
will do nothing to restore support for ‘WTO 1.0’; on the contrary it will signal a loss of 
confidence in the organisation. But the refinements of a ‘WTO 2.0’ would be useless if the 
foundations in ‘WTO 1.0’ begin to crumble. 
 
Refactoring the mega-regionals 
 
As described by the participating governments, the objectives outlined for the mega-regional 
agreements (RCEP, TTIP, and TPP) are to pursue comprehensive and innovative market 
liberalisation.25 If we accept that they are now inevitably one part of the new trade reality, 
                                               
22 Richard Baldwin, WTO 2.0: global governance of supply-chain trade. CEPR Policy Insight. Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, 2012. 
23 Especially since none of the mega-regionals includes both of the G-2. 
24 The evidence that deeper commitments on IP and investment are required to support supply network trade is 
not particularly strong; for example, there is no evidence that 'deepening' IP rules beyond basic compliance with 
e.g. the WTO TRIPS provisions increases FDI flows, see Michele Boldrin and David Levine, The case Against 
patents. Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (1) 2013, pp 3-22. 
25 For the objectives of the TTIP see, European Commission, European Union and United States to launch 
negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. 2013: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=869. The objectives of the TPP as at 2011 are outlined by 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative. Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 
November 2011: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outlines-trans-pacific-
partnership-agreement. For the brief objectives of the RCEP, see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership negotiations. 2012: http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/rcep/. 
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how can they be made to signal something more positive about the future of the non-
discriminatory multilateral system? Would it be possible to provide a path from Regional 
Trade Agreement (RTA) based reduction and elimination of trade barriers – especially NTMs 
– to multilateral reduction and elimination of the same barriers on a non-discriminatory 
basis? 
 
‘Multilateralising’ the provisions of RTAs is a program that, so far, has no subscribers; 
despite much talk and enthusiasm for the idea, there has not been a single incidence of a 
regional trade liberalisation provision being transformed into a multilateral agreement after 
the fact.26 Also, even if the parties to the RTA are willing to dilute their discriminatory 
benefits by extending some aspect of their agreement to the rest of the world, the provisions 
of regional agreements are usually so specific to the regional context that they do not readily 
translate to the multilateral level. 
 
One distinguishing feature of the mega-regionals, however, is their scale, which to some 
degree overcomes the problem of regional specificity. Each of the mega-regions includes 
economies that account for a large proportion of world production and trade. In 2011 the 
TTIP partners accounted for half of world output and almost one third of world trade; the 
TPP partners account for about 40 per cent of world output and RCEP participants about 30 
per cent of world output in 2011. On account of this scale alone, any positive obligations 
accepted by the partners of one or other of the mega-regionals is likely to set a globally-
relevant standard for trade or related regulation. For example, the proposed Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will address industrial and services standards and 
professional accreditation differences between the United States and the EU. By virtue of the 
size of the TTIP region, the adoption of joint or homologated standards by these two would 
likely set a world standard that could prove attractive on a commercial basis to manufacturing 
and services firms in many regions of the world, providing the basis for a multilateral (or at 
least 'critical mass') adoption by countries outside the region. A similar potential may be 
found in the other ‘mega-regional’ agreements – TTP and RCEP or even the proposed EU-
Japan RTA27 – for progress on NTMs in phytosanitary and technical barriers to trade; 
accreditation and professional standards barriers to business services; IP protection barriers; 
competition policy protection barriers; trade and customs facilitation; and, the scope of 
temporary protection such as anti-dumping and safeguards. 
 
A second distinguishing feature of the mega-regionals is that they centre on the G-2, with the 
United States playing a leading role in two of the largest and China being the likely largest 
participant in the third.28 Seen in a positive light, this polarity offers an opportunity for 
parsimony in the creation of positive provisions/standards in each of the mega-regionals, 
greatly enhancing the chance that they might be adopted multilaterally. If the same regulatory 
provisions or the same or similar standards (or methods for aligning variant national 
standards) were promoted by the G-2 in their mega-regional negotiations, the ‘playing field’ 
covered by these agreements would be more level. But early action would be needed to 
                                               
26 This is not to say that there has been no transmission of ideas between RTAs and the multilateral system: it 
could be argued, for example, that the inclusion of an innovative provision liberalising services trade in the 1988 
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement provided some lessons for negotiators of 
the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (1995). But the ANZCERTA agreement, based on a 
‘negative list’, is much more comprehensive and much simpler than the GATS. 
27 See European Commission, Countries and regions: Japan. 2013: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/countries/japan/. 
28 Japan, too, will now be a member of both the TPP and RCEP. 
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secure such an outcome. By the time the schedules to the agreements are written the 
opportunity for alignment on trade regulation among the new trading blocs will have 
disappeared; the ‘multilateralising’ agenda will again fail. The challenge is to negotiate these 
provisions of the mega-regionals with a beforehand view to their global application. 
 
Could the G20 do something to promote a beneficial alignment between the mega-regional 
trading blocs? If it is inevitable that these agreements will characterise the trading system in 
the first half of the 21st century, the G20 has an interest in pressing its leading members to 
adopt harm-minimising strategies for their agreements that will minimise mutual 
discrimination. Specifically – in the language of trade negotiators – they should encourage 
intra-regional collaboration on ‘modalities’29 for eliminating tariff and tariff-quota protection, 
for eliminating or minimising non-tariff-measures (including industrial and phytosanitary 
standards) and for opening services markets (including by advances in mutual recognition or 
harmonisation of professional standards).  
 
Collaboration among G20 members to pre-align ‘modalities’ does not necessarily mean 
having the same thresholds, time-frames or trade coverage for the implementation of positive 
provisions in each of the mega-regionals. Nor does it mean the same outcomes in each 
agreement. It means only that the same barriers to trade would be liberalised in the same way. 
This is useful in negotiations on NTMs and services market restrictions because the impacts 
of the restrictions themselves resist direct measurement and comparison. In these domains, 
‘reciprocity’ in trade agreements is typically defined by the use of the same regulatory 
modality – say, compliance with the same international phytosanitary standard, or making the 
same proportional changes to a tariff-quota threshold, or prohibiting the use of certain forms 
of production support, or agreeing to the access to local enforcement measures for intellectual 
property protection – without attempting to measure and specify outcomes in different 
markets.  
 
An ‘intra-regional’ framework adopted by the G20 would aim to provide a consistent 
framework for use in the future by all WTO Members, but would also provide a basis for 
minimising inconsistencies between the provisions of mega-regional agreements. A uniform 
framework of modalities would also facilitate harmonised terms of accession to each of the 
mega-regionals for economies that are not initial participants. It might, for example, permit a 
member of the RCEP, such as Indonesia for example, to identify a clear path to membership 
of the TPP based on a different set of thresholds or time-frames or coverage applied within 
the same regulatory framework as it had accepted in the RCEP. 
 
                                               
29 WTO agreements must be applicable in hundreds of different economies. Accordingly, they typically specify 
the outcomes to be achieved by members’ trade regulations rather than the content of those regulations, allowing 
each government a degree of flexibility in the application of their policies and laws. The desired outcomes in 
any economy from a trade negotiation may depend, however, on pre-existing conditions. For example, 
governments may be unable to agree to cut all barriers on agricultural imports to the same low level in every 
market because this would mean that some countries will make no cuts to protection (if their import barriers are 
already low) and some will make huge cuts to protection (because their barriers are currently high). An 
agreement along these lines would fail the test of ‘reciprocity’ among WTO members. Governments may, 
instead, agree to implement cuts that have a similar proportional impact on existing levels of protection in every 
economy. The way in which the similarity of the proportional cut is determined and implemented is a modality 
(a method or an approach). Most of the negotiations in WTO trade negotiations are concerned with modalities 
rather than with e.g. specified levels of protection. Negotiators necessarily focus on modalities when the 
regulation of interest has outcomes that are difficult to quantify; that means, most NTMs such as barriers to 
market entry based on product or services standards. 
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If the G20 is sufficiently seized of the danger that the mega-regional agreements will fracture 
the multilateral trading system, there is still time to develop an inter-regional framework of 
modalities. As at mid-2013, the participants in the TPP are still aiming for a final draft 
agreement by the end of the year. The participants in the TTIP are still working on their 
statements of objectives, while the participants in the RCEP are at an even earlier stage of the 
groundwork for their agreement.  
 
The challenges that would be involved in such a ‘meta-framework’ for negotiations are not 
trivial. But they are almost certainly less than those faced by the Doha negotiators. The 
modalities framework need not, after all, be a binding agreement between the framework 
subscribers. It could be a G20 ‘code of practice’ for the mega-regionals for reference during 
their negotiations and could be revisited in the light of experience during the mega-regional 
negotiations. China, the EU, India and the United States would be essential subscribers to the 
framework but they would not be asked, as they were in the Doha negotiations, to commit to 
specific outcomes in their mega-regional negotiations. Instead, the framework would signal 
their intention to, for example, eliminate certain classes of NTMs (export prohibitions and 
subsidies; all quantitative measures; services restrictions based on nationality…); or to cover 
certain aspects of competition and investment laws; to favour the recognition of international 
professional standards; to adopt the same approaches and time-frames for aligning product 
standards among members of the regional agreement; or to use the same (simplified) 
approaches to specifying preferential rules of origin. 
 
Governments’ experience in the Doha modalities negotiations (since 2001) would be relevant 
and perhaps helpful in the development of an inter-regional modalities framework. Many of 
the considerations and challenges will be familiar. But even if it took a year to develop such a 
framework – even if the framework were incomplete and ad referendum – it would be worth 
the effort to send a more positive signal about the future of the non-discriminatory world 
trading system 
 
Conclusion 
 
G20 member governments should be seriously concerned by signals from the G-2 about the 
direction of their trade policy during the next few decades that will also see an unprecedented 
historic transition in global economic ‘mass’. The proposed mega-regional agreements will 
undermine the value of a key asset in the trading system: the multilateral agreements of the 
WTO. Most of the G20 will be losers from any weakening of WTO guarantees of non-
discriminatory treatment during this period of economic transition. 
 
A declaration by G20 economies participating in the TPP, TTIP, RCEP and EU-Japan mega-
regional agreements that they will seek prospectively to align modalities in those agreements 
for the liberalisation of goods, NTMs and services and, in principle at least, that they will 
offer these modalities as the basis for future WTO agreements that would be open to 
accession by other WTO members, would help to maintain a credible future for the non-
discriminatory multilateral system. 
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Global value chains: implications for trade, investment and development 
policies 
 
John Ravenhill 
 
 
Value chains have been the principal engines driving globalisation. Starting in the 1960s, 
companies increasingly began to move some of their operations offshore, seeking to reduce 
costs by sourcing components or conducting labour-intensive operations in countries with 
lower wage rates. This ‘fragmentation’ of the production process was facilitated by three 
developments: increasing liberalisation of trade and investment regimes; changes in 
technology that substantially reduced the costs of transporting goods; and the emergence of 
new business models.  
 
Companies that controlled the various stages of production – from research and development 
to manufacture to marketing and distribution – were able to concentrate on those stages that 
were most profitable. Beginning with the athletic footwear industry – the ‘Nike model’ – 
companies increasingly opted out of the manufacturing process rather than themselves 
establishing subsidiaries offshore, generating their profits from their control over design, 
brand name, and distribution. Although they often did not have any equity stake in their 
suppliers, they provided critical inputs such as the blueprints for products. The electronics 
industry quickly followed this model, with many of the big-name companies in computing 
and mobile phones outsourcing their manufacturing. The logic of the business model has 
been carried furthest in recent years by Apple, which derives its profits from its control over 
research and development, proprietary technology, brand name, and distribution channels, but 
contracts other companies to make its products. 
 
The fragmentation of production has dramatically transformed the structure of international 
trade, integrating developing economies into manufacturing networks. By the middle of the 
first decade of this century, for instance, manufactures accounted for 85 per cent of the total 
merchandise exports of developing East Asia and they constituted nearly three-quarters of 
ASEAN’s exports. International merchandise trade is now increasingly based on vertical 
specialisation, that is, trade in components that are part of the same product. World trade in 
components increased substantially in the first decade of the 21st century, up from 24 per cent 
of global manufacturing exports in 1992–3 to 54 per cent of the total in 2003.30 In the same 
period, the share of developing economies in exports produced within value chains doubled, 
primarily because of growth that occurred in East Asia. In 2007-8, exports within value 
chains accounted for fully 60 per cent of East Asia’s manufacturing trade, in comparison with 
a world average of 51 per cent.31 The incorporation of China into global value chains has 
been a major factor in the transformation of international trade: in 2000-2008, China 
accounted for two-thirds of the world’s processing exports (followed by Mexico with slightly 
under one-fifth).32 Although typically more difficult to measure, trade in services has become 
an increasingly significant dimension in the development of value chains. 
 
                                               
30 OECD, Moving up the (global) value chain. Policy Brief. July 2007. 
31 Yuqing Xing and Neal Detert, How the iPhone widens the United Statestrade deficit with the People’s 
Republic of China. ADBI Working Paper 257. Tokyo, Asian Development Bank Institute, May 2011. 
32 World Trade Organization/IDE-JETRO, Trade patterns and global value chains in East Asia: from trade in 
goods to trade in tasks. Geneva, WTO, 2012. 
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The significance of value chains had long been recognised by economic geographers and 
theorists of international business. Increasingly, the economics profession has acknowledged 
that the contemporary structure of international production and trade bears little resemblance 
to traditional theories of international trade. In turn, the major multilateral economic 
institutions have become interested in value chains and their implications for policies on trade 
and development. Global value chains have, in the words of the WTO’s Director-General 
Pascal Lamy, produced ‘a new paradigm where products are nowadays “Made in the 
World.”’33 If, indeed, there is a new paradigm, what are the implications for how we 
conceive of international trade – and what policy implications for the G20 flow from this 
reconceptualisation? 
 
‘Made in the World:’ implications for global imbalances 
 
At the Pittsburgh summit, leaders of the G20 agreed to work together to ensure a lasting 
recovery from the global financial crisis and to establish the foundations for strong and 
sustainable growth in the medium term. The Framework for Strong, Sustainable and 
Balanced Growth launched at Pittsburgh is the centrepiece of the Group’s approach. Through 
the Mutual Assessment Process, the G20 aims to establish growth objectives for the global 
economy, the policies needed to reach them and (with support from the IMF) mechanisms for 
assessing progress towards the agreed goals. At the Paris meeting of G20 finance ministers in 
February 2011, agreement was reached on the indicators that would be monitored as part of 
the Mutual Assessment Process. One of the indicators that figured prominently was external 
imbalances ‘composed of the trade balance and net investment income flows and transfers’ 
(in addition to various indicators of domestic balances such as public debt and fiscal deficits, 
and private savings and debt). 
 
Trade imbalances have been the indicator that – since the demise of the gold standard in the 
1920s – has attracted the most attention from politicians and the media, even though a focus 
on trade balances, particularly those between pairs of countries, makes little sense from the 
perspective of economics. Data on the balance of trade are convenient, however, in that they 
are relatively easily calculated and are seemingly intuitively plausible gauges of whether or 
not countries are behaving responsibly in their international economic relations. The advent 
of global value chains, though, has significantly complicated the calculations of trade 
imbalances. 
 
The most vivid demonstration of the new complexities of international trade balances has 
come through work that has focused on the geographical distribution of value added in 
several of Apple’s flagship products. Although these are ostensibly ‘Made in China’ – and for 
balance of trade purposes, their full value is classed as a ‘Chinese’ export – only a very small 
portion of the total value of the product is actually added within China. For one iPhone4 
assembled in China (by the Taiwanese company Foxconn) and sold in the United States, 
trade data would indicate a Chinese export valued at $194.04. Slightly over $24 of this figure 
consists of components sourced from the United States: one iPhone4 consequently would 
contribute $169.41 to the bilateral US trade deficit with China. However, all of the 
components for the phone are actually sourced from elsewhere: China’s value added consists 
only of the labour used in the assembly, a total of only $6.54. When measured on a value-
                                               
33 World Trade Organization, 15 years of the Information Technology Agreement: trade, innovation and global 
production networks. Geneva, WTO, 2012. 
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added basis, most of the cost of the iPhone4 import is attributed to other countries, notably 
Korea (Samsung supplies the display and memory chips for the phone).  
 
Figure one: geographical sources of value added for an iPhone4 (in $US) 
 
  
 
Source: OECD (2011)34 
 
Xing and Detert estimate that imports of iPhones alone contributed close to $2 billion to the 
recorded US trade deficit with China.35 If these imports had been measured in value-added 
terms, however, the figure would be less than $75 million. The iPhone example is but one 
dimension of the complications that the spread of global value chains have caused for 
measuring trade imbalances: again focusing on what is currently the most politically sensitive 
imbalance, that between China and the United States, the WTO estimated that the overall US 
trade deficit in China would have been cut by more than 40 per cent in 2008 if it had been 
measured in value-added terms rather than by conventional national trade statistics.36 But it is 
not just the US-China trade balance that looks remarkably different when measured in value-
added terms: the substantial trade deficit that Korea runs with Japan largely disappears when 
trade is measured in value added. 
 
One important implication of the growth of value chains therefore is that new measures of 
international trade are required if sound policies are to be adopted both to identify and to 
rectify global imbalances – a need recognised by the WTO and OECD in their joint project to 
                                               
34 Koen De Backer, Global value chains: preliminary evidence and policy issues. OECD, 19 May 2011: 
http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/47945400.pdf. 
35 See Table 2 in Xing and Detert, How the iPhone widens the United Statestrade deficit with the People’s 
Republic of China. 
36 See figure 9, p. 104 in: World Trade Organization/IDE-JETRO, Trade patterns and global value chains in 
East Asia: from trade in goods to trade in tasks. 
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produce a database on ‘Trade in Value Added.’37 Value chains also constrain the 
effectiveness of policy instruments traditionally used to address trade imbalances: with final 
products being assembled from components sourced from many countries, a change in a 
bilateral exchange rate, for instance, may have unpredictable effects because it will not only 
weigh on the domestic content of a country’s exports but will also affect the cost of imported 
components. Data on value added also have the advantage of avoiding the current problem of 
double-counting that occurs when components cross borders before assembly into a final 
product (which leads, for instance, to a substantial overstatement of the overall significance 
of intra-regional trade in East Asia). Furthermore, measuring trade in value added provides a 
far more accurate indication of the contribution that services make to international trade. 
 
Trade policy implications of the growing importance of global value chains 
 
Value chains have been at the heart of the conventional wisdom that economic integration in 
the Asia-Pacific has been ‘market-driven.’ At one level, such arguments are correct – the 
Asia-Pacific, of course, lacks the supranational regional institutions of Europe. On the other 
hand, the role of governments in facilitating the growth of value chains should not be 
overlooked. Their contribution over the last three decades has taken many forms: the 
establishment of export-processing zones that permitted duty-free import of components for 
assembly into products that were subsequently exported, zones that were the basis for the 
early footholds that many countries in the region including China gained in these networks; 
similar but non-geographically specific provisions through duty-drawback arrangements; the 
unilateral lowering of tariffs (important throughout the region from the mid-1980s onwards); 
and government commitments in regional and global trading agreements, not least the 1996 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA) that freed up a substantial part of trade in the 
region’s single most important export sector. Specific tariff provisions on the part of 
countries importing assembled products in some instances have encouraged outsourcing of a 
number of processes and the import of specific inputs, e.g., the US ‘yarn forward’ rule, which 
requires the use of US materials if the product is to benefit from US tariff concessions. 
 
Two extremes on the spectrum of policies are evident in responses to the rapid growth in the 
role of value chains. One is to suggest that the success of value chains is testimony to the 
effectiveness of current policies – whether unilateral measures by governments or global 
treaties such as the ITA: nothing more needs to be done. The other extreme is a stark 
reiteration of the ‘Washington Consensus’ agenda of the 1980s: if countries want to gain the 
full benefits of participation in global value chains then they should simply liberalise their 
trade and investment policies and take the state out of the economy as far as possible. Neither 
of these extremes is particularly helpful. 
 
While it is the case that export-processing zones and similar arrangements have facilitated the 
participation of developing economies in value chains, the potential gains to the local 
economy are constrained when participation in networks is confined to geographical 
enclaves. Better to make the duty-free import of components consistent across the whole 
economy. And while it is the case that nominal tariffs have fallen dramatically in many 
developing countries, tariffs can still be significant impediments. The effect of residual tariffs 
is magnified in a world in which components cross borders, sometimes on multiple occasions 
(final assemblers, for instance, may pay tariffs on their imported inputs and then face tariffs 
                                               
37 For an explanation of Trade in value added see OECD, Measuring trade in value added: an OECD-WTO joint 
initiative. May 2013: http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/measuringtradeinvalue-addedanoecd-
wtojointinitiative.htm. 
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on the full value of their exports including these inputs). And while the Information 
Technology Agreement has frequently been hailed as the single most significant trade 
liberalisation measure since the WTO came into existence, the sector has developed 
substantially in the fifteen years since the ITA was signed so that the agreement’s coverage of 
products in this sector is increasingly incomplete. A strong case can be made for a 
substantially revised ITA.38 
 
In other words, much can still be done through traditional trade policy agendas to facilitate 
the operations of global value chains. But efficiency within global value chains also depends 
heavily on non-tariff barriers that impede the movement of components and goods across 
borders. Among the most important of these are efficient customs procedures and processing, 
and standards setting and certification procedures. Here substantial potential exists for mutual 
recognition or harmonisation of product standards. These are the so-called ‘21st century’ trade 
issues that are figuring prominently in current negotiations such as those for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. 
 
Global value chains and investment 
 
The proliferation of global value chains has come at a time of unprecedented levels of foreign 
direct investment. The relationship between the two is not as straightforward as might appear 
from a superficial reading, however. Significant numbers of global value chains are 
associated with little or no foreign direct investment. This characteristic is particularly 
evident in what are often referred to as ‘buyer-driven’ chains that dominate the textile and 
apparel industry, for instance. Here the principal contribution of the lead firms to their 
suppliers is to provide the specifications to which goods are produced (and of course the 
marketing channels through which the final products are sold). Even in more technologically 
intensive sectors such as automobiles, the principal contribution of the lead firms in a value 
chain may be to provide blueprints and often technical assistance to their suppliers, 
sometimes seconding their engineers to work at their suppliers’ manufacturing plants. No 
equity relationship is involved.  
 
Other value chains may include foreign direct investment relationships but not those linking 
the home country of the lead firm and the countries doing the assembly. In the athletic 
footwear industry, for instance, the investment in Southeast Asia where plants manufacture 
for leading international brands such as Nike came not from the US company but from 
Korean and Taiwanese manufacturers. In electronics, much of the foreign direct investment – 
whether for Apple or for other mobile phone brands such as Nokia – again comes not from 
the lead firm but from electronic contract manufacturers based outside of Europe and North 
America. Outside of the industry relatively few people are aware of the scale of these 
companies: HonHai, whose Foxconn subsidiary assembles most of Apple’s products in 
China, has grown into the world’s 60th largest company (by revenue), with total sales in 2011 
of over US$90 billion, more than 50 per cent above those of Apple, its principal customer. 
Although HonHai alone accounts for almost half of the total revenue of contract 
manufacturers, the industry features other large players including the Singapore-based 
Flextronics, ranked 334 on the Fortune Global 500, with 2011 sales of US$29 billion. 
 
                                               
38 See, for example, Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Future-proofing world trade in technology: turning the WTO 
IT Agreement (ITA) into the International Digital Economy Agreement (IDEA). ECIPE Working 
Paper. Brussels, European Centre for International Political Economy, 2011. 
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There is little to suggest that global value chains are currently inhibited by the lack of a 
global treaty on foreign direct investment. Countries in East Asia have signed on to multiple 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) (many more than the preferential trade agreements they 
have joined – agreements that have attracted far more attention). In 2011, East Asian 
countries were parties to 577 BITs: China alone was a signatory to 128.39 And many of the 
recent bilateral trade agreements also contain chapters on investment. While the effectiveness 
of some of these instruments is indeed debatable, the wisdom of attempting to negotiate a 
global treaty on foreign direct investment is also questionable. Each of the attempts to 
negotiate a global investment treaty – beginning with the International Trade Organization in 
the immediate post-war period through the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 
the second half of the 1990s – foundered on conflicts over the balance between the rights and 
responsibilities of foreign investors. In the current era where developing countries are more 
effective actors in global negotiations than ever before, agreement seems unlikely. And a 
global agreement is likely to face concerted opposition from civil society groups; the days 
have long since passed when Nike could claim that it had no responsibility for the labour 
conditions under which its shoes were produced because these were controlled by 
independent subcontractors. 
 
Value chains and the development agenda 
 
A country’s effective participation in value chains requires more than a simple liberalisation 
of its trade and investment regimes. Two issues are particularly noteworthy here. The first is 
that the countries that have been the focal point for value chains are ones that have good 
infrastructure that permits the easy movement of components and final goods within 
countries and across national boundaries. The answer to the question of why iPhones are 
manufactured in China rather than Indonesia lies in part in the latter’s poor-quality 
infrastructure, reflected in the time to ship a container from the local port to the US West 
Coast being nearly double for Indonesia. The second issue is that the gains to local economies 
will be limited unless they are able to move up the value chain. 
 
In this context, it is important to remember that the origins of the ‘fragmentation’ of 
production into value chains lay in the capacity of lead companies to choose to focus on those 
areas of activity where they could derive the most profits. Consider again the iPhone 
example. Apple’s profit on the iPhone is variously estimated to be between 58 and 64 per 
cent of the retail price. Roughly ten per cent of the profits go to components suppliers in 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The value added in China is less than one per cent of the product’s 
retail price. And, while this lack of local contribution to the overall value of China’s exports 
is extreme, it is symptomatic of a broader problem: less than one-fifth of the value of China’s 
‘processing exports’ is estimated to originate domestically, and less than one half of the value 
of total exports.40 Not surprisingly, China’s leaders have expressed their determination to 
move from ‘assembled’ in China to ‘designed and manufactured’ in China. Frustrations with 
being stuck in the low-value-added activities in value chains have the potential to cause a 
trade policy backlash in developing economies. 
 
The World Bank has increasingly warned countries in the region – including China – that 
they risk becoming stuck in a ‘middle income trap’ where they are unable to compete with 
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40 Robert Koopman, William Powers, Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei, Give credit where credit is due: tracing 
value added in global production chains. NBER Working Paper No. 16426. September 2010. 
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more technologically advanced countries and simultaneously are under pressure from lower 
labour cost economies. To escape this trap, countries need to move up the value chain, which 
inter alia, will require effective policies to strengthen innovation, enhance skills, and upgrade 
the capabilities of domestic suppliers. If the G20’s approach to value chains is to retain the 
support of developing economy members, then an agenda on trade facilitation will need to be 
accompanied by one that assists economies in upgrading their local capabilities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Global value chains have dramatically transformed international trade. For the G20, a number 
of implications follow. The first is that in addressing global imbalances through the Mutual 
Assessment Process, the G20 needs to eschew conventional measures of trade imbalances 
and focus on data that accurately reflect where the value of final products is actually created. 
Second, even though the various measures that governments have put into effect to facilitate 
the free movement of components have substantially reduced the significance of tariffs as 
impediments to the operation of value chains, the exceptions are still of sufficient 
significance that the traditional trade policy agenda of liberalising border barriers is still 
relevant. Third, behind the border barriers take on increasing importance both because of the 
fall in tariffs and because the need to produce regionally or globally will be facilitated by 
mutual recognition or harmonisation of standards. Fourth, the relationship between value 
chains and foreign direct investment is substantially more complex than is sometimes 
presented: little evidence exists that the absence of a global treaty on foreign investment is a 
significant impediment to the operation of value chains. Finally, while many developing 
economies are benefiting from participating in value chains through increases in employment 
and exports (and sometimes through inward foreign direct investment), the profits generated 
within value chains are distributed in a markedly uneven manner. Such disparities fuel 
nationalist sentiments in developing economies. Efforts by industrialised economies to 
promote trade liberalisation and facilitation within the G20 will need to be linked to an 
agenda that contributes towards the improvement of infrastructure and towards the upgrading 
of the capabilities of local firms if they are to gain sustained support from the G20’s lower 
income economies. 
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International trade: what can the G20 do?41 
 
Mark Thirlwell 
 
 
Trade and the G20 
 
As the world’s premier international economic forum, the G20 should have a keen interest in 
the maintenance of a robust multilateral trading system. Yet while the initial leaders’ summits 
made strong references to the importance of open markets, and of completing the long-
running Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, subsequent meetings have seen trade 
slide down the agenda and witnessed a decline in the intensity of the G20’s pledge to refrain 
from protectionism. Meanwhile, the multilateral trading system itself appears to be losing 
relevance.  
 
Both trends are problematic since international trade, with its critical contributions to 
supporting global growth and employment, has an important role to play in assuring the 
health of the global economy. Just as the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced 
Growth (the ‘Framework’) and its commitment to delivering growth and jobs for the global 
economy should be at the core of the G20, so should international trade be at the core of the 
Framework.42 G20 leaders need to re-emphasise this central role of global trade and use their 
political influence to help restore the health of the multilateral trading system. 
 
The G20’s two key trade commitments 
 
The onset of the global financial crisis represented a major shock to global trade. Between its 
onset in 2008 and stabilisation towards the end of 2009, the world economy experienced the 
steepest decline in international trade on record, with a pace of contraction that even 
exceeded that experienced during a comparable period of the Great Depression.43 Given the 
scale of this shock, it was natural to fear that policymakers might be tempted to succumb to 
protectionism and repeat some of the mistakes of the 1930s. Mindful of such risks, when G20 
leaders held their first summit in Washington in November 2008, along with listing the 
reforms they wanted to see applied to the global financial system and to international 
economic governance, those leaders also went on to state: 
 
‘We recognize that these reforms will only be successful if grounded in a commitment to free 
market principles, including the rule of law, respect for private property, open trade and 
investment, competitive markets, and efficient, effectively regulated financial systems.’ 
[Emphasis added] 44 
 
They then made two specific commitments. First, they pledged to refrain from protectionism 
(the ‘standstill’): 
                                               
41 A longer version of this paper will be published as a Lowy Institute Analysis. 
42 On the importance of the Framework, see Mike Callaghan, Strengthening the core of the G20: clearer 
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for International Policy, 10 April 2013. 
43 Barry Eichengreen and Kevin H O'Rourke, A tale of two depressions (3rd update). VoxEU.org, 1 September 
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‘We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in 
times of financial uncertainty. In this regard, within the next 12 months, we will refrain from 
raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export 
restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to 
stimulate exports.’45 
 
Second, they promised to work to complete the Doha Round: 
 
‘. . . we shall strive to reach agreement this year on modalities that leads to a successful 
conclusion to the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda with an ambitious and balanced 
outcome. We instruct our Trade Ministers to achieve this objective and stand ready to assist 
directly, as necessary.’ 46 
 
While leaders have also discussed other trade-related topics, these two key commitments 
have been at the core of the G20’s approach to trade.  
 
Assessing the standstill 
 
When leaders introduced their one-year standstill on protectionism at the Washington 
Summit in 2008, the initial pledge came with no monitoring mechanism.  However, at the 
London Summit in April 2009, leaders not only extended the standstill until the end of 2010 
but they also tasked the WTO and other international organisations with providing quarterly 
monitoring. At the Toronto Summit in June 2010, the standstill was again extended, this time 
until end-2013 and at the Seoul Summit (November 2010), monitoring was moved to a semi-
annual basis. Most recently, at the Los Cabos Summit in June 2012 the standstill was 
renewed once more, this time until end-2014, despite reported opposition from Argentina, 
Brazil and South Africa.47   
 
The disappointing news is that, according to the eight official joint OECD-WTO-UNCTAD 
reports on trade and investment protectionism produced to date, it is clear that G20 members 
have not fully honoured their commitments. Indeed, the initial pledge had been broken within 
about thirty-six hours, after which Russia announced that it would hike tariffs on car imports. 
Moscow’s actions were quickly followed by an increase in Indian steel tariffs and later by the 
EU reintroducing export subsidies – a combination of moves which seemed to leave the 
pledge ‘in tatters.’48  Moreover, on one count, in the years following the declaration of the 
standstill, on average a G20 member broke the pledge every four days, doing little for G20 
credibility.49   
 
On the other hand, it has certainly not all been bad news. Taken together, the same series of 
reports suggest no widespread retreat to protectionism but, on the contrary, only a fairly 
modest shift to restrictions on trade. Indeed, given the sheer scale of the initial trade collapse, 
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the lack of recourse to protectionist measures is arguably quite striking.50  In fact, in the 
second and third years after the onset of the crisis, the pursuit of trade liberalising measures 
meant that tariffs were more frequently lowered than hiked.51 
 
Unfortunately, other assessments tend to be less sanguine than this official accounting. For 
example, a series of independent assessments produced by the Global Trade Alert (GTA), 
paint a less comforting picture.52 At the time of writing, GTA had produced eleven reports on 
protectionism, with the most recent released in June 2012.53  These GTA reports emphasise 
two key developments. First, that the share of G20 countries in global protectionist measures 
had increased from 60 per cent in 2009 to 79 per cent in 2012, a result that GTA felt ‘cast the 
repeated G20 commitments to eschew protectionism in a particularly bad light.’  Second, that 
rather than violate their WTO commitments, governments had instead tended to circumvent 
WTO rules by resorting to policies ‘subject to less demanding or no binding multilateral trade 
rules.’  Since many of these policies were non-transparent, the GTA described this as ‘murky 
protectionism.’54 Moreover, looking at the GTA’s rankings of the top ten offenders by 
country on various indicators of protection, ‘it is striking how often G20 members are 
mentioned.’55 
 
Overall, then, the evidence on the effectiveness of the G20’s repeated commitments to limit 
protectionism is mixed. It does seem that there was some restraining effect on the use of 
WTO-consistent policies such as tariffs and trade defence measures. Supporting evidence for 
this proposition is provided by the likelihood that if this were not the case then those 
economies that balked at the renewal of the standstill pledge at Los Cabos would not have felt 
any need to object. And clearly there has been no re-run of a 1930s-style protectionist 
backlash. Set against this, however, is the fact that G20 members have sought to find 
alternative, less transparent approaches to protectionism as a way of avoiding their 
commitments, and at other times have been prepared to simply ignore them. 
 
Another concern is that the text relating to protectionism in G20 summit communiqués has 
shown signs both of being weakened over time and of being given less prominence.56  By the 
Pittsburgh Summit, for example, references to trade policy had been demoted to the end of 
the leaders’ declaration, and the previous commitment to eschew protectionism had been 
replaced with a weaker one to ‘fight’ it. This relative de-emphasis of trade has led one pair of 
observers to conclude that any ‘strong views of the deterrent value of G20 commitments are 
hard to square with a body that has given less and less attention to open markets over time.’57 
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Assessing the promise to conclude Doha 
 
The second big trade commitment made at repeated G20 leaders’ summits has been an 
undertaking to complete the Doha Round. First made at the inaugural leaders’ summit in 
Washington in 2008, these promises have continued to be issued after subsequent meetings. 
However, they have also become weaker and less specific: 
 
• At the London Summit, leaders committed themselves to reaching an ‘ambitious and 
balanced conclusion’ to the Doha Round.58   
• At Pittsburgh, they targeted a ‘successful conclusion in 2010.’59 
• At Toronto, they avoided a hard deadline altogether and said only that they would 
deliver a conclusion to Doha ‘as soon as possible.’60 
• By Seoul, they were only reminding themselves that ‘2011 is a critical window of 
opportunity, albeit narrow.’61 
• At Cannes, the ambition had been pared back to a promise to ‘pursue in 2012 fresh, 
credible approaches to furthering negotiations.’62 
• Finally, by the Los Cabos Summit, leaders were reduced to promising to ‘continue to 
work towards concluding the Doha Round ... .’63 
•  
By the time of the Mexican summit, leaders were left contemplating only the harvest of what 
they could salvage from Doha – a sort of mini-Doha – based around those few areas where 
agreement might be possible, such as trade facilitation and special treatment for the least 
developed countries (LDCs). By this stage, the urgency expressed for a conclusion of the 
Doha Round at the Washington and London Summits had long disappeared, along with pretty 
much any serious belief that G20 leaders were going to be able to deliver on their, 
increasingly weak, commitments. Ultimately, leaders have publicly and repeatedly failed to 
push the Doha Round to a conclusion, in a way that has been damaging to the G20’s 
credibility.64   
 
Four key challenges of the multilateral system 
 
The G20’s mixed success with the standstill and its failure (at least to date) to offer the 
leadership required to bring the Doha Round to a conclusion are symptoms of a broader 
malaise afflicting the multilateral trading system and the WTO. There are at least four 
important issues: 
 
First, the failure to complete Doha now spans four failed WTO Ministerials (five if the failure 
to launch a Round in Seattle is included).65  This involves significant costs that go beyond the 
foregone gains from trade liberalisation that a successful round would have brought, to 
include the damage to the credibility of the WTO and of the G20, and the lost trade certainty 
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that would have been offered by locking in tariff rates and other trade disciplines under 
Doha.66 
 
Second, there is a growing consensus that the WTO’s focus on Doha has meant that it has 
failed to grapple with other, potentially more important, issues facing the global trading 
system. For example, Mattoo and Subramanian have argued that the WTO’s Doha Agenda ‘is 
an aberration because it does not reflect one of the biggest – indeed tectonic – shifts in the 
international economic and trading system: the rise of China.’67  A longer list of trade policy 
issues that the WTO and the multilateral system should be dealing with would include: the 
trade policy implications of national and international efforts to reduce carbon emissions; 
resource (especially food) security, including the role of export restrictions; the role and 
treatment of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs); and issues around exchange rate policy and 
trade.68 
 
Third, the need for trade policy to come to grips with the implications of global value chains 
(GVCs) and the so-called ‘Made in the World’ phenomenon. GVCs have changed the 
political economy of protectionism, by making some economies ‘so interconnected and 
integrated that trade policy is no longer a very useful tool to assist domestic industries, even 
in the face of a massive external demand shock.’69  In this environment, many observers have 
argued that traditional understandings of trade policy are now obsolete.70  The same changes 
also suggest the need for an updating of the WTO, which ‘has not kept up with the need for 
new rules governing the intertwining of trade, investment, intellectual property, and services,’ 
and which therefore requires an upgrade to what has been described as a ‘WTO 2.0’.71 
 
Fourth, a failure to meet the appetite for new and deeper forms of international economic 
integration has encouraged member economies to swap the multilateral system for 
preferential (bilateral, regional and now mega-regional) trade arrangements (PTAs). By 2010, 
there were almost 300 PTAs in force, with the average WTO member a party to 13 PTAs. 
Intra-PTA trade had risen to about 35 per cent of world merchandise trade by 2008, up from 
18 per cent in 1990.72 While it is true that, despite the marked increase in the number of 
PTAs in recent years, around 84 per cent of world merchandise trade still takes place on an 
MFN basis (70 per cent if intra-EU trade is included), it is also the case that PTAs are 
increasingly becoming the vehicle through which countries pursue the kind of ‘deep 
integration’ that is relevant for much of modern trade. The shift to PTAs risks reducing the 
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relevance of the multilateral system to the governance of global trade and undermining the 
MFN principle. These risks are likely to become even greater if the mooted mega-regional 
deals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in Asia and the EU-United States 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) reach successful conclusions. 
 
Five things that the G20 could do 
 
Taking into account the limitations of the G20’s past engagement with international trade and 
the nature of the challenges currently facing the multilateral trading system, there are at least 
five things that G20 leaders could do to bolster the international trading environment. 
 
First, leaders should place international trade where it belongs, at the heart of the Framework 
and of the G20’s commitment to deliver economic growth and employment. In doing so, they 
should reverse the drift of trade policy issues down the G20’s agenda and send a clear signal 
about the important contribution the trading system could make. They should acknowledge 
forcefully that in the absence of a robust international trading system and the growth in world 
trade that this supports, it would become that much harder to fulfil the G20’s core mandate of 
delivering strong, sustainable and balanced growth. 
 
Second, when the current standstill agreement expires at the end of 2014, leaders should not 
only extend it for at least another two years, but they should also seek to upgrade and refine 
it, in order to take into account both the post-crisis shift to new, WTO-consistent measures of 
protection and the need to unwind the restrictions on trade imposed since the start of the 
GFC. In order to support this commitment, leaders should also commit to ensure that the 
WTO secretariat is supplied with the enhanced resources required to pursue the independent 
surveillance needed to monitor compliance with this commitment.73  While it is true that past 
experience with the standstill has demonstrated the limitations of surveillance in keeping 
protectionist impulses in check, there are still important benefits from both the transparency 
and hence accountability that this process delivers. In addition, enhanced WTO surveillance 
in this way could also provide helpful support to the WTO’s broader policy agenda.74 
 
Third, the time has come for leaders to help save the WTO from the Doha Round.75 Ideally, 
that should involve harvesting what can be saved from the negotiations so far. For example, 
Hufbauer and Schott have identified five parts of the existing Doha Agenda which they argue 
offer the possibility of delivering significant benefits to WTO members at relatively little cost 
or pain: trade facilitation; duty-free, quota-free access for LDCs; the phase-out of farm export 
subsidies; reforms to the WTO’s dispute settlements system; and new disciplines on food 
export controls.76 Leaders should use their political weight to push seriously for the 
conclusion of a mini-Doha agreement along these lines, and then allow the WTO to move on 
to other matters.  
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If, however, leaders conclude instead that there is no realistic possibility of reaching even a 
modest agreement along these lines (after all, a previous attempt to follow this approach 
failed in 2011), then they should declare Doha dead and urge the WTO to find a new way 
forward on trade negotiations. Such a decision would of course be highly controversial. But 
in the absence of such a resolution, the continued failure to complete Doha will serve only to 
erode the credibility of both the WTO and of the G20 itself. If leaders conclude that Doha 
really is beyond saving, they should now put it out of its misery. This approach would also 
have the benefit of presenting leaders with a clear choice: to help save Doha or to kill it. 
 
Fourth, leaders should also use their political weight to encourage the WTO to devote more 
time to a trade policy agenda fit for the twenty-first century. As discussed above, there are a 
range of issues that would fall into this category, including food and resources security and 
the use of export restrictions, the treatment of SOEs, the role of exchange rate policy and the 
intersection of climate change and trade policies. The importance of services trade, and of 
GVCs, should offer particular scope for WTO-led initiatives that go beyond Doha.77 A 
‘whole of the value chain’ approach that spanned a range of sectors including transport and 
distribution services, border protection and management, product health and safety, foreign 
investment and the movement of business people and service providers could potentially 
stimulate trade and growth while also increasing the relevance of the WTO for business.78 
 
Two other, connected issues are also deserving of particular attention in this regard. First, the 
relationship between the multilateral trading system and the proliferation of PTAs, including 
the looming mega-regionals like the TPP and TTIP. There have been a range of suggestions 
for further work in this area that could be pursued, ranging from proposals for standstills on 
new PTAs and action on tightening up WTO rules on PTAs, through to measures aimed at 
improving the design and transparency of PTAs and on to proposals to multilateralise 
agreements or provide ‘docking’ mechanisms for PTAs.79 Second, the reason that these 
proposals are necessary is that there is a demand for the kind of ‘deep integration’ offered by 
PTAs that is not being met by the WTO. This indicates the need to look for ways in which the 
WTO might offer a compelling alternative. The most likely approach here is to revisit the 
idea of ‘variable geometry’, based in large part around the opportunities provided by 
plurilateral agreements.80   
 
Fifth, and finally, leaders should build on the recognition they made at Cannes and at Los 
Cabos on the need to strengthen the WTO. At Los Cabos they declared: 
 
‘We support strengthening the WTO through improving the way it conducts its regular 
business, and its dispute settlement system. We also direct our representatives to further 
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discussions on challenges and opportunities for the multilateral trading system in a 
globalized economy.’81 
 
Much as leaders in the past have used their political capital to urge reform of the IMF and 
World Bank, they should now do the same for the WTO. While leaders would need to be 
careful not to be seen as inappropriately usurping a member-controlled organisation, the fact 
that the G20 includes most of the key players in global trade means that a coordinated G20 
opinion on reform would carry significant weight. Areas for potential reform include the 
WTO’s practice of consensus, the ‘Single Undertaking’ in multilateral negotiations, the role 
of MFN, the operation of the Disputes Settlement Mechanism, and the conduct and scope of 
WTO surveillance.82 The problems facing WTO reform are not a shortage of ideas – there’s a 
large body of work already available – but rather an absence of political will to give impetus 
to reform.  This, of course, is where the G20 should have a particular comparative advantage. 
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Australia must exhort the G20 to lead on multilateral trade liberalisation 
by example not words 
 
Brett G. Williams 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Australia will host the eighth G20 Leaders’ Summit in November 2014 in Brisbane. The 
leaders’ declaration from each of the seven earlier G20 Leaders’ Summits between 2008 and 
2012 included a commitment to work toward completion of the WTO’s Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, but gradually, the declarations have come to reflect the 
disagreement among WTO members on the content of the draft texts. There is disagreement 
on many aspects of the draft texts, including the level of ambition, the balance between 
liberalisation in non-agricultural market access, and in agricultural trade and in trade in 
services, and within each area on the scope and depth of commitments by various members 
and for different products or sectors. Members accuse each other of asking for too much or 
giving too little. In the G20 declarations, the emphasis has shifted from completing the 
agreement on modalities ‘based on progress already made’83 to the pursuit of ‘fresh, credible 
approaches to furthering trade negotiations.’84   
 
All the G20’s declarations have achieved nothing in terms of completing the Doha Round. 
Words are cheap. Action is harder. Australia’s hosting of the G20 is an opportunity to shift 
the G20 Members into leading through actions rather than mere words. A fresh, credible 
approach should involve asking G20 members to demonstrate their commitment to 
multilateral trade liberalisation, not just to talk about it.  
 
The political problem with trade liberalisation  
 
The WTO is a mechanism that makes it politically feasible for governments to reduce barriers 
to trade. Ordinarily, in the absence of any trade agreement, the government’s decisions are 
susceptible to substantial political pressure from groups for whom the per capita gain from 
opposing liberalisation exceeds the per capita cost of manifesting that political opposition, 
that is, producers competing against imports. This pressure is rarely offset by the political 
weight of other groups for whom the per capita gain from supporting trade liberalisation 
exceeds the cost of providing that political support. The situation is one where if politicians 
support trade liberalisation they lose political support, and possibly lose office. This tends to 
make unilateral trade liberalisation difficult. There may be exceptional situations where 
purchasers of imports are themselves producers with substantial political weight and as value 
adding is broken down into more and more discrete steps in geographically dispersed supply 
chains, these exceptions may become more common – but exceptions they remain.  
 
A trade agreement which provides for a reciprocal exchange of market access commitments 
changes the domestic political dynamics. The trade agreement gives exporters a tangible 
reason – in the form of an expected gain from export sales – to lend political support to a 
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government which implements the trade agreement. This provides a counterbalance to the 
government’s loss of political support from those competing against imports and therefore 
makes trade liberalisation a much less politically risky action for governments and 
politicians.85 Apart from the initial step of implementing trade liberalisation, governments set 
the rules of the agreement so that they cannot be subsequently left stranded in a position in 
which the gains to exporters do not materialise but the losses to import-competing producers 
do. They know that obstructions to market access by one party can be met with obstructions 
to market access by other parties. They also know that even if the decision to adopt the trade 
agreement is finely balanced, the downside political risk may diminish over time as the new 
more liberalised setting will cause the exporters to become more politically influential and 
the import-competing producers to lose a little of their relative political weight.  
 
Political scientists and economists modelling behaviour of governments in relation to trade 
agreements have specified that both reciprocity and non-discrimination are essential 
conditions for the feasibility of trade agreements.86 Integral to those requirements is the 
degree of predictable market access opportunities that exporters derive from the agreement, 
which in turn affects their inclination to provide political support. In the context of GATT 
and WTO negotiations, non-discrimination has meant an unconditional most favoured nation 
rule, though with some significant exceptions. Some experts have also stressed that 
gradualness is also a requirement.87 This acknowledges that the extent of political opposition 
may rise more than proportionally with the level of ambition toward trade liberalisation 
embodied in the trade agreement. Whatever theoretical models might show, we know from 
real world interaction that trade agreements have come into force when there have been 
considerable departures from perfect reciprocity or non-discrimination and with varying 
degrees of ambition. It must be that there are additional factors at play: perhaps commitment 
to economic reform, ideological reasons, or occasionally manifestations of friendship and 
altruism. Nevertheless, these three elements of reciprocity, non-discrimination and 
gradualness are helpful in gaining an understanding of the inability to reach agreement in the 
Doha Round.  
 
Factors compounding the difficulties in reaching agreement on further trade 
liberalisation 
 
The outcomes of all previous GATT and WTO negotiations determine the starting point for 
the Doha Round. In previous rounds, the parties that have liberalised the most have been able 
to reach a roughly reciprocal bargain in the presence of some free-riding by other countries, 
because the trade of the free-riding countries was not sufficiently significant to stop each 
party from reaching an internal political situation satisfactory for them to proceed with 
ratifying and implementing the agreement. However, this has left some parties with much 
higher average tariff levels than others: on non-agricultural goods, the average bound tariff is 
only 3.5 per cent for high-income countries, but 19.1 per cent for non-LDC developing 
                                               
85 See the representation of this dynamic as a Prisoner Dilemma model in Kenneth Abbott, The trading nation’s 
dilemma: the functions of the law of international trade. Harvard International Law Journal 26 (2) 1985, pp 
501-532. 
86 This proposition is supported in Kyle Bagwell and Robert W Staiger, An economic theory of GATT. The 
American Economic Review 89 (1) 1999, pp 215-248, and the later book, The economics of the world trading 
system. Cambridge, MIT Press, 2002 using a terms of trade model by Wilfred J.Ethier, Political externalities, 
nondiscrimination and a multilateral world. Review of International Economics 12 (2) 2004, pp 303-320 (based 
on earlier PIER Working Paper 02-030, September 5 2002 available at http://www.econ.upenn.edu/pier, that 
uses a political pressure model).  
87 In Ethier, Political externalities, a third requirement of gradualness is set out.  
35 
 
countries; on agricultural goods, the average bound tariff rate is 31.9 per cent for high-income 
countries, but 53 per cent for non-LDC developing countries.88  The difference is smaller if 
applied rather than bound rates are compared, but the ranking is the same. In relation to trade 
in services, rates of protection are harder to quantify, since protection arises from a variety of 
instruments, but it is clear that the degree of liberalisation implemented under Uruguay 
Round GATS commitments varied greatly among countries.89  
 
Past rounds were also affected by the laxness around the application of the Article XI 
prohibition on ‘restrictions other than import charges.’ In sectors where the rule was 
ineffective, there tended to be both high levels of protection and an inability to agree on tariff 
reductions. Though the problem was mostly solved in the Uruguay Round, it has left a legacy 
of high rates of protection in some sectors and, therefore, substantial unevenness in the levels 
of protection in different sectors.  
 
Together this means that WTO members have a variety of starting positions in the Doha 
Round. On goods, some have low average tariffs, some high average tariffs and some have 
flat tariff structures – but some with low average tariffs have very high tariffs in a small 
number of sectors. On services, some are bound not to apply quantitative restrictions or to 
derogate from national treatment across around a hundred subsectors. Others are completely 
free to apply quantitative restrictions or derogate from national treatment on all but a few 
services subsectors. There are many variations in between. Many countries have a significant 
number of services sectors for which they are committed not to derogate from national 
treatment but are still free to impose quantitative restrictions.      
        
One might generalise that the countries that have already reduced protection to very low 
levels face difficulty in finding a way to offer further liberalisation – the potential for big 
changes only exists in the most politically sensitive areas. At the same time, countries that 
still have very high bound rates of protection would need to reduce protection by big margins 
to induce significant possibilities of new trade flows. But they are reluctant to make those big 
changes, for the changes offered by less protectionist countries are insufficient to help 
overcome political resistance.  
 
The internal politics of trade has been changed by the proliferation of discriminatory trade 
agreements. Exporters who are not already receiving preferential market access may be 
expected to receive a big enough per capita gain (net of lobbying costs) to motivate them to 
provide political support for a multilateral trade agreement. If, however, they already have 
preferential access, the net per capita gain from a multilateral trade agreement may not be 
large enough to motivate them to provide that political support. Further, exporters who are 
aware that exporters in other countries already have preferential market access may be more 
inclined to spend their limited political energy supporting a new preferential agreement to 
catch up with the access others already have. These influences would tend to be larger when 
the margin of preference between preferential rates and MFN rates is larger. Perversely, the 
only thing that can reduce the margins of preference and shift back to non-discrimination is 
multilateral liberalisation, but multilateral liberalisation is made less likely by the margins of 
preference. 
 
                                               
88 See table 1 in Martin and Matoo, The Doha Development Agenda: what's on the table? 
89 See, p. 169 of Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, Empirical analysis of barriers to international services 
transactions and the consequences of liberalization. In A handbook of international trade in services, edited by 
Aaditya Matoo, Robert Stern and Gianni Zanini. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.   
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The problem which trade in goods used to have as a result of a weak prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions is a current and continuing problem with trade in services. Just as the 
GATT suffered from its birth defects that weakened the rules until the Uruguay Round, so the 
GATS suffers from the birth defect that members can opt in and out of the prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions on numbers of services suppliers, service transactions or assets 
utilised. The economic effect of a quantitative restriction is the same whether it exists in 
relation to imports of goods or services. Negotiations to reduce the extent of derogations from 
national treatment are pointless when members are free to retain quantitative restrictions.  
 
In summary, we have a situation where departures from reciprocity and non-discrimination in 
the past are eroding the feasibility of further multilateral trade liberalisation. The gradualism 
constraint has also become a problem because the existing height of import barriers in less 
open countries means that exporters in more open countries are less likely to be drawn into 
the political debate unless they receive large absolute reductions in the level of protection. At 
the same time, it probably remains true that in the less open countries, the strength of 
opposition to reducing barriers increases more than proportionately with the extent of change 
that is proposed.  
        
As some more open countries have pushed for a higher level of ambition, pressure has also 
emerged for less ambition. However, those resisting change have not resisted it evenly across 
all products and sectors. As a reflection of what is at stake for private players and their 
motivation to engage in politics, all countries, including those more open and those more 
closed, have sought to exempt certain products or sectors from liberalisation or to take them 
off the table completely. These exclusions would have a massive effect on the economic 
gains achieved. The rule of thumb is that the ratio of the economic welfare gain from 
removing a high level of protection to the corresponding gain from removing a low level of 
protection is equal to the square of the ratio of the high rate of protection to the low rate of 
protection.90  Therefore, (ceteris paribus), removing a 90 per cent tariff generates economic 
gains which are approximately 81 times bigger than the economic gains that would accrue 
from removing a 10 per cent tariff.  
 
In agriculture the negotiation has been divided into three areas – market access, export 
subsidies and other subsidies – and difficulties have arisen over the level of ambition in each 
area. There has been a consensus that export subsidies should be phased out but contention 
remains over the reduction in domestic subsidies. A number of factors indicate that import 
barriers ought to be a much higher priority for the WTO than domestic subsidies. First, 
domestic subsidies distort production decisions but not consumption decisions, whereas 
import barriers distort both. Second, modelling has demonstrated that of the total gains to be 
achieved from liberalising agriculture, 90 per cent would come from reducing import 
barriers.91 Third, existing WTO rules already give members rights to countervail against 
exports assisted by domestic subsidies and the right to seek multilateral authorisation for 
sanctions against countries whose subsidies displace exports from third markets. Fourth, 
                                               
90 As noted on p4 of Will Martin and Kym Anderson, Agricultural trade reform under the Doha Agenda: some 
key issues. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 52 2008, pp 1-16. Also pp 196-198 
of James E. Anderson and J. Peter Neary, Welfare versus market access: the implications of tariff structure for 
tariff reform. Journal of International Economics 71 2007, pp 187-205. 
91 See Thomas W. Hertel and Roman Keeney. What is at stake? The relative importance of import barriers, 
export subsidies and domestic support. In Agricultural trade reform and the Doha Development Agenda edited 
by Kym Anderson and Will Martin. Washington, DC, World Bank, 2006. See also Table 1.4 in Kym Anderson 
and Will Martin, Agriculture, trade reform and the Doha agenda. In Agricultural trade reform and the Doha 
Development Agenda, edited by Kym Anderson and Will Martin. Washington, DC, World Bank, 2006. 
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domestic subsidies are disciplined to some extent by domestic fiscal pressures. Fifth, 
allowing an escape valve for domestic subsidies helps some governments overcome political 
opposition to reducing tariffs. The reality is that achieving breakthroughs in reducing import 
barriers in sensitive areas is unlikely without allowing the escape clause for domestic 
subsidies and deferring to later rounds of negotiation a comprehensive transition from 
production linked to non-distorting forms of subsidy. However, negotiation has acquired a 
dynamic in which developing countries demand developed countries substantially reduce 
domestic subsidies as a precondition for developing countries cutting import tariffs.  
 
For some of the countries that are more willing than others to offer greater liberalisation in 
the Doha Round, the unwillingness of others has led them to the view that further multilateral 
liberalisation cannot proceed on the basis of an unconditional most favoured nation clause. 
Their realist position is that the laggards should be denied the capacity to free ride and need 
to be faced with the possibility of being left at a disadvantage in a more liberal trading 
system. This leads to the latest phenomenon: where those countries seeking liberalisation 
have virtually given up putting forward any new proposals under the WTO, and have 
concentrated their efforts on negotiating liberalisation in ways that would exclude free riders, 
such as the proposed Plurilateral Agreement on Services,92 the Trans-Pacific Partnership,93 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership,94 and through various bilateral 
negotiations.  
 
Some argue that multilateral negotiations have been held back by the commitment to a ‘single 
undertaking’, a phrase which has been used to describe what are, in fact, two different ideas. 
First, there is the idea that all WTO members should be bound by the complete set of WTO 
agreements rather than being able to opt in or out. Second, it refers to the idea that everything 
must be agreed as a complete package or that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. As 
members have become frustrated with their lack of success in closing the negotiations, 
various members have supported an early harvest package, in departure from the previous 
commitment to a single undertaking. This involves slicing off particular issues into stand-
alone agreements. Reaching agreement on such early harvests appears not to be easy. The 
obvious reason is that a stand-alone agreement may not embody sufficient trade-offs to reach 
a reciprocally beneficial outcome. Australia has supported trying to reach agreement in the 
WTO on particular agreements one by one,95 possibly in the belief that there is some 
substantial benefit from demonstrating that conclusion of WTO agreements is feasible.   
 
However, it is certainly not obvious that departing from the concept of a single undertaking 
by slicing the negotiation up vertically is likely to be a better pathway to a more open trading 
system than would be achieved by slicing the negotiation up horizontally with an early 
                                               
92 A subset of WTO members has been negotiating a Plurilateral Agreement on Services. Reports indicate that 
they intend it to conform to GATT Article V, thereby enabling them to discriminate against non-parties.  
93 For a description of the TPP negotiations, see New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations. 2013: http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-
Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/index.php.  
94 Heads of State/Government of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and ASEAN’s free trade agreement(FTA) partners – Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand, 
Joint Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. 21st 
ASEAN Summit and Related Summits. Pnomh Penh, 20 November 2012. For more information on the RCEP 
see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership negotiations. 
95 See the speech made by the Australian Minister for Trade: Craig Emerson, Address to the Plenary Session of 
the 8th Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization. December 15 2011: 
http://www.trademinister.gov.au/speeches/2011/ce_sp_111216.html.  
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harvest package that retains all sectors but with a more modest and gradual level of ambition, 
and leaves some part of the liberalisation for a later trade round.        
 
Objectives of further multilateral trade liberalisation 
 
Given the difficulties in reaching a successful Doha Round agreement, G20 declarations 
exhorting WTO members to try harder or redouble their efforts will not achieve anything. 
They need to do something tangible, even if small and incremental. They can take a small 
step to exposing producers to foreign competition and to assist exporters in gaining access to 
foreign markets.  Even a small incremental change may be politically unpopular but this 
political downside can be mitigated in two ways.  
 
First, if the change is small, the extent of the opposition should be limited. Second, by taking 
a collective step for the benefit of all, political leaders may be able to acquire some 
counterbalancing support from a wider constituency. In an agreement among the entire 159 
WTO members, the internal political calculus of each government is more likely to be based 
on how much support is lost from import-competing producers and how much 
counterbalancing support might be gained from exporters. Considerations of contributing to 
the common good or to the maintenance of a non-discriminatory trading system based on 
price rather than power are unlikely to weigh much in the internal politics of many, if any, 
countries. In 159 countries, it is too easy to leave others to maintain the trading system and to 
insist on a safe political deal for oneself. However, the group of 20 leaders may just be small 
enough to be able to avoid a free-rider effect. They may be able to encourage each other to 
take just a small risk in domestic politics in order to contribute to a common good.   
       
How could the G20 structure such a tangible step? A useful starting point would be the words 
of the preamble to the WTO Agreement in which all WTO members have committed to ‘the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.’ Grounding their actions in that 
existing commitment would help justify their actions. They can argue collectively that in the 
absence of some multilateral agreement to reduce MFN trade barriers, there will not be any 
mechanism to move toward less discrimination. However, it does not have to be a large step. 
They can acknowledge that one small step may be the first step toward a comprehensive and 
ambitious multilateral trade agreement. They might also acknowledge that if this is not 
achieved, and the WTO cannot catch up with the depth of trade integration being achieved in 
some bilateral and regional trade agreements, it can still fulfil a function of taking 
incremental steps to reduce margins of preference and continue to gradually eliminate 
discrimination in international trade.  
 
A specific proposal 
 
Prior to the Leaders’ summit, all G20 members should submit schedules of new WTO 
commitments as follows: 
 
1.1 A GATT Schedule which contains a new binding on every line of the customs 
classification, covering all products industrial and agricultural. The new binding 
should be 2 per cent below the existing binding, that is, no more than 98 per cent 
of the existing binding.  
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Comment:  
 
(a) In the Doha Round negotiations, even the most protectionist members of the G10 
appear ready to make a 23 per cent cut over six instalments on their most sensitive 
products. The rate chosen for the G20 initiative ought to be just as politically 
digestible as the cut to the most sensitive products would have been under the 
draft text.  
(b) There should be no exceptions for the reasons explained above about the relative 
size of economic welfare gains accruing from cuts to different-sized rates of 
protection.  
 
1.2 All members having non-zero budget outlay commitments on export subsidies 
should reduce the budget outlays for all product groups by 3 per cent, that is, the 
new bindings must be no more than 97 per cent of the existing bindings. 
 
Comment:  
 
(a) Parties reducing import tariffs should not be placed in a worse position in relation 
to competition from imports receiving the benefit of export subsidies.  
(b) Treatment of export subsidies should be consistent with a long-term objective of 
eliminating them completely. 
  
1.3 Without limiting the existing caps on domestic support or the extent to which 
existing remedies may be applied against domestic subsidies, all members must 
adopt an additional commitment not to pay domestic subsidies (within category 
of subsidies required to fall within the existing Aggregate Measure of Support 
cap – that is, price or production linked subsidies) on a product which add up to 
more than 100 per cent of the value of the product at world market prices.  
 
Comment: 
 
(a) This compromises between the objective of allowing resort to domestic subsidies 
as an escape clause to facilitate reduction of import barriers and the objective of 
encouraging members to transition domestic subsidies from production linked (i.e. 
out of the AMS category) to non-production linked when the subsidies are big 
enough to have significant distorting effects.  
 
2 A GATS schedule that applies the unqualified prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions (Article XVI:2(a) to (d)) to 3 additional services subsectors covering 
cross border supply and supply through commercial presence.  
 
Comment: 
 
(a) Failing to achieve further moves to national treatment might be seen as a 
weakness since a member might be free to impose burdens on foreign suppliers. 
However, this would represent a move toward repairing the birth defects of the 
GATS. As the prohibition on quantitative restrictions applies to more sectors, it 
will become easier to achieve further liberalisation in negotiations and also 
unilaterally since, under the MFN rule, access provided to service suppliers from a 
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particular country would have to be extended  to suppliers from any WTO 
member.   
 
(b) This approach would not achieve integration among WTO members as deep as the 
integration being achieved in some bilateral or regional agreements. However, it 
would provide a discipline against rates of protection and margins of preference 
increasing, and would facilitate greater incremental liberalisation over time which 
would reduce both rates of protection and margins of preference.    
 
3 Implementation Period:  
 
Each member could choose a date for the new schedules to come into force 
within 30 months from the summit.  
 
4 Multilateralising the Deal 
 
The G20 members should encourage all other WTO members to make the same 
additional commitments. The G20 members would apply the MFN rule to the 
new concessions for ten years but reserve the right to apply for a waiver from the 
MFN rules, to the extent necessary for them to deny the benefit of these 
concessions to members who have not made similar concessions within ten years.  
 
Comment:   
 
(a) A group constituting seventy-five per cent of members could vote themselves a 
waiver to permit themselves to deny the benefits to those who don’t join in. 
 
Too little or too much? 
 
Some might say that the proposed liberalisation is too much. But how could any member 
seriously hold to the position that a two per cent reduction in import tariffs and three per cent 
in export subsidies over up to 30 months is indigestible. There might be a couple of instances 
where reduction down to a one hundred per cent cap on domestic subsidies would require 
some adjustment, but a thirty-month transition is accommodating. It is doubtful that there are 
any members who could not find three service subsectors to which they could commit to not 
having quantitative restrictions, when they are not being asked to bind national treatment. To 
the extent that some difficulty would be encountered, the question would be whether it is 
worth that price for the gain of preserving the WTO as an institution for implementing 
multilateral liberalisation. 
 
Some might say that the proposed liberalisation is too little. In that case, there ought to be no 
difficulty in agreeing to it and implementing it. There would, after all, be no reason why it 
could not be repeated.  
 
What should not be repeated at the Brisbane G20 summit is just another doomed exhortation 
to G20 members and WTO members to increase their negotiating efforts. Australia should be 
asking all who want to have a multilateral trading system to put their money on the table. 
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